Toshiaki Ijuin

<p>This paper proposes a new interpretation of "the Socratic Paradox", the doctrine that no one does evil things voluntarily and those who do evil things do so through ignorance. To understand the significance of this doctrine, we should first look into the confusion over Socrates' comments on the doctrine and related problems. Socrates asserts the Socratic Paradox many times in Plato's early dialogues, but when we look at the texts carefully, we find out that his comments are frequently not very consistent with the Socratic Paradox. 1, The Socratic Paradox needs as its prerequisite a very special psychology that denies the existence of good independent desires. Once the existence of good independent desires is admitted it is quite difficult to reject the possibility of akrasia which the Socratic Paradox never admits. However, in the Gorgias, though Socrates strongly maintains the Socratic Paradox, it clearly seems at the same time that he admits the existence of good independent desires. Some scholars maintain that this inconsistency is only apparent and deny that he truly admits the existence of good independent desires. However, their interpretations cannot be squared with Socrates' comments at 503c-d, where he clearly admits that a good person who knows what is good does have bad desires. Socrates also admits the existence of good independent desires in many passages, in almost all of Plato's early dialogues which express Socrates' desire for beautiful persons. When we consider these passages carefully, it is difficult to assume that he considers this desire of his as anything other than a good independent desire. 2, At Gorgias 474b, Socrates seems to clearly declare that he can construct for anyone an elenchtical argument that would truly convince the listener of the logic of his comments on justice. However, at Gorgias 525b-c Socrates also speaks in a way that clearly indicates that some very wicked persons can not be rehabilitated. In that passage, Socrates indicates that even gods cannot rehabilitate some persons. But what gods cannot do, human beings can never do. This can hardly be explained unless we assume that he admits the existence of good independent desires. 3, At Gorgias 488a and Apology 37a, Socrates says that he never does evil things voluntarily, but it is clear in these passages that he says this not because he thinks that no one does evil things voluntarily. It is also clear that in these passages he contrasts his way of life with those of other people. From his comments and context, it is hard to determine whether he assumes the Socratic Paradox. One might protest that at Apology 37a he only says he never does injustice voluntarily because he knows injustice is evil, while many people do not know that injustice is evil. However, in the Apology, Socrates' use of the phrase "to do injustice" is almost the same as "to harm others" and he asserts that to understand that harming others is evil is very easy(25a). So it is not easy to understand why Socrates, who maintains the Socratic Paradox, says at Apology 37a that he never commits injustice voluntarily. I propose a new interpretation of the Socratic Paradox to clarify this confusion. I think the language used in Socrates' elenchtical arguments does not describe a given fact, but is rather a kind of speech act. When we are asked "You desire happiness, so you desire only what you think to be good, don't you?", we are apt to answer "Yes". When we say this(not just "We will(or should)desire good things" but "We do desire good things"), the response does not describe a fact, but is rather a speech act with which we determine how to live. It seems clear that this kind of language is at work when Socrates obtains agreement from those he argues with that they desire good. So, since he must construct his</p><p>(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)</p>