唐 燕霞

Chinese government declared that the target of state-owned enterprise reform, which is one of the three major reforms, was almost attained at the end of 2000. However, state-owned enterprise remains as a big issue. The purpose of this study is to examine the stock system reform of large-sized state-owned enterprise. The hearing investigation took place in Jiangsu-province in China in March and September 2001. The eight incorporated companies investigated in the area will three corporate governance models; an authorization management model, the party committee initiative type model, and a stock diversification model. An authorization model is promoted by the separation of the government. By shifting from the national property management company-it is preserved by the conventional government function-to the parent company, the interference of governmental corporate management will be neutralized. To some extent, the separation of the government and companies would be carried out. On the other hand, the issue of a parent companies increasing power of maximum stockholder will be a concern. In comparing with the clarification of property rights, the responsibility and rights, the separation of the government, and the science-inaction of management, a stock diversification would be the most ideal model. As a result, the stock system reform will gradually change from the authorization management model to the stock diversification model. However, we must not ignore the rule of a party and the stock diversification model because a state-owned enterprise organization is closely connected to the socialist system and because the party will continue to associate with the internal structure of corporate governance in a certain way.

本文在〓結以往単位研究文献的基〓上,从至今的単位研究比較欠缺的公司治理的角度,分析了改革后単位体制的変化,尤其是国有企〓中党委影〓力的変化。〓者〓〓,改革后由于経〓自主〓的下放,経〓者経〓〓策〓的〓立等改革措施的〓施,党委在企〓経〓管理中的影〓力有所削弱。但是,企〓内党委仍然控制着人事任免〓并〓有対企〓重大〓題〓策的参与〓,因而可以〓以党〓政治核心的公司治理結〓基本上并改変。今后随着市〓経済的〓一歩推〓,如何規定党委在企〓中的地位及作用〓会成〓国企改革的重大課題。

随着改革的深入,市場経済体制的推〓.〓中国的国有企〓〓行公司化改制.并逐歩建立現代企〓制度成〓近年来世界〓注的焦点。如何明〓国有企〓的〓〓.建立有数的公司治理結〓,是国有企〓改革所面〓的重大課題。本文从国有企〓領〓体制的〓史変迂着手,并根据〓者参加的日本〓〓研究机〓〓中国的国有企〓〓行的〓巻凋査,分析了目前国有企〓内部領〓体制(治理結〓)的特点,掲示了目前存在的「内部人控制」|〓題。并指出国有企〓存在的〓題源自于〓〓制度的不明〓,是〓〓経済体制的后遺症.〓既是个経済〓題,同〓也是个政治〓題,要〓活国有企〓,在〓行経済体制改革的同〓,必須推〓政治体制的改革。